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Making Sense of Value 
Adrian M. S. Piper 
If I were to agree with everything Elizabeth Anderson says in this 
powerful and finely conceived work I would not be doing my job.1 So I 
will pass over her compelling critiques of cost-benefit analysis, rational 
desire theory, and "consequentialist"2 moral theories, among many 
topics she dispatches successfully, with fierce intelligence and wit. In- 
stead I want to focus on the centraljustificatory strategy that underpins 
her defense of her pluralist, nonconsequentialist, rational attitude the- 
ory of value. Anderson states at the outset that she is not that interested 
in such metaethical questions as whether value judgments express 
beliefs or emotions or other attitudes (p. xiii). But I think her own 
answers to these questions might have implications for normative and 
pragmatic issues of concern to her. So I want to try tinkering with the 
metaethical arguments in ways that might streamline her treatment 
of the normative and pragmatic ones somewhat. 
I. EXPRESSIVE STATES 
To say that someone or something is valuable, on Anderson's account, 
is to say that it is rational, that is, makes sense for someone to value 
her or it. To value that person or thing intrinsically is to have a 
"complex of positive [or favorable] attitudes" toward her or it (pp. 2, 
17, 124). Favorable attitudes toward people or things are diverse: they 
include being inspired, attracted, interested, pleased, awed, emotion- 
ally involved, attentive, or concerned (p. 2). Anderson does not define 
what she means by an attitude, but she describes it, first, as an expres- 
sive state, and second, as "partly constituted by norms that determine 
[its] proper objects" (p. 3). 
1. Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). All page references to this volume are parenthesized in the text. 
2. I explain the scare quotes in "A Distinction without a Difference," in Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy, vol. 7, Social and Political Philosophy, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore 
E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1982): 403-35. 
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I want to leave aside this second clause for the moment and con- 
centrate on the notion that an attitude is an expressive state of the 
agent. What kind of state is an expressive state? A brain state? A 
dispositional state? An emotional state? Or perhaps all of the above? 
What does an expressive state express? Emotions? Thoughts? Desires? 
Impulses? Perceptions? Or all of the above? 
I will describe a yes answer to these questions as the inclusive 
conception of an attitude. On the inclusive conception, an attitude can 
express emotions, thoughts, desires, impulses, perceptions, or any of 
the other myriad internal states-brain, dispositional, emotional, and 
so on-that constitute our mental life. And to say that an attitude, on 
this conception, expresses any such state is to say that the bare presence 
of this state necessarily manifests its particular contents in overt physi- 
cal change-as, for example, inner turmoil might manifest itself in 
rapid breathing, dilated pupils, increased heart rate, and agitated 
movement of the limbs. So the inclusive conception of an attitude 
implies that for any internal state constitutive of our mental life, there 
is necessarily some observable, physical manifestation of it. 
Now on Anderson's view there cannot be a necessary connection 
between any such state of the agent (whether brain state, dispositional 
state, or emotional state) and a particular physical manifestation of it. 
For that would conflict with her later attempt to distinguish appropri- 
ate from inappropriate expressions of an attitude (pp. 83, 129). If 
the connection between an internal state and a particular physical 
expression of it is a necessary one, there is no point in evaluating it 
as appropriate or inappropriate. That physical expression of it is not 
subject to reform. 
Similarly, Anderson's view cannot realistically imply that any such 
mental state-whether thought, desire, impulse, or perception-has 
some observable physical manifestation. For we learn to conceal and 
internalize our thoughts, desires, impulses, and perceptions in the 
process of socialization: to keep our thoughts to ourselves, to suppress 
our desires, to refrain from acting on our impulses, to register our 
perceptions without reacting to them. This skill of controlling and 
internalizing our reactions is, in essence, what the process of socializa- 
tion teaches, and, as Nietzsche observed, it is the origin of the interior- 
ity of our mental lives. But any such state that, for reasons of socializa- 
tion, individual constitution, or personal control, has no physically 
observable manifestation cannot be meaningfully described as an ex- 
pressive state at all. So it cannot be true that, as the inclusive conception 
claims, all internal states constitutive of our mental lives are expressive 
states, nor, therefore, that all internal states constitutive of our mental 
lives conform to Anderson's conception of an attitude. 
However, for later purposes Anderson will want to insist that 
anything that is an attitude is necessarily expressive. She will also want 
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to insist that an attitude can be expressed appropriately or inappropri- 
ately. Since the inclusive conception of an attitude implies the rejection 
of both of these features, Anderson should reject the inclusive concep- 
tion of an attitude. 
By contrast, an exclusive conception of an attitude toward a person 
or thing might define it as a specifically emotional response, or disposi- 
tion to so respond, to that person or thing, such that the emotion is 
caused in part by the agent's perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about 
the object of valuation. On the exclusive conception, an attitude is an 
expressive state in that there is a necessary connection between the 
agent's inner emotional state and some overt physical manifestation. 
However, it excludes any necessary connection between any such emo- 
tional state of the agent and a particular physical manifestation, since 
Anderson needs to be able to distinguish between the attitude itself 
and the appropriateness with which it is expressed. 
For the same reason, the exclusive conception of an attitude ex- 
cludes any necessary connection between the agent's inner emotional 
state and any intentional action, whether of execution or of omission. 
Thus, the exclusive conception of an attitude excludes certain thoughts, 
desires, impulses, and perceptions unless they bear the right kind of 
causal connection to emotions. And it leaves open whether a particular 
attitude is expressed only in the most subtle and minimal overt physical 
changes or in gross behavior or action of an appropriate or inappropri- 
ate kind. For these reasons, Anderson should accept the exclusive 
conception of an attitude. 
Let us assume, provisionally, that she does. Then to value intrinsi- 
cally a person or thing, is, first of all, to respond with positive emotions 
to one's perceptions and beliefs about her or it. However, not just any 
favorable emotional response to a person or thing counts as valuing 
it. Positive valuations must be "governed by distinct standards for 
perception, emotion, deliberation, desire, and conduct" (pp. 2, 3). Par- 
ents who value-love-their children will feel not only proud when 
their children achieve, but alarmed when they are in danger, and dis- 
posed to rescue them. Parents who felt pride at their children's achieve- 
ments but only indifference or regret rather than concern at their endan- 
germent could not properly be said to value them at all. So to Anderson's 
account we can add that intrinsically valuing a person or thing requires 
not only a complex of favorable emotions and dispositions toward her 
or it, but also that this complex exhibit a certain internal consistency 
determined by our concept of valuation itself. Only a certain specific set 
of favorable responses, elicited under their appropriate conditions, counts 
as, for example, loving or respecting or admiring a person or thing. 
That is, our valuation concept provides both a criterion for identifying the 
constellation of favorable attitudes constitutive of it and also a standard of 
adequacy against which these responses can be measured. 
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On Anderson's account, valuing a person or thing in a particular 
way requires that this constellation of favorable attitudes-perception, 
emotion, deliberation, desires, and conduct "express and thereby com- 
municate one's regard for the object's importance" (p. 11). Here 
Anderson goes beyond the exclusive conception of an attitude I advo- 
cated above. That conception built in only the most minimal notion 
of expression, namely some overt physical manifestation of the agent's 
emotional state. The notion of expression Anderson invokes here 
builds in two further conditions: first, that an authentic valuation 
should "express [those] valuations in the world, . . . embody them in 
some social reality ... actually establish the relationship to the object 
of one's concern which is implicit in one's attitudes toward it" (p. 17). 
This seems right. An agent who is not moved to establish some such 
connection with the object she values either does not really or deeply 
feel what she claims to feel, or else her purported values have strictly 
armchair status. There is a natural causal link between emotion and 
behavior expressive of it in all cases, no less so in the case of that 
complex of emotions partly constitutive of valuation. If one really 
values something, one is disposed to act accordingly. 
However, we can grant this much without requiring, as Anderson 
does, that the connection between valuing and action be a necessary 
one. The connection may be merely sufficient, such that a failure or 
inability to express one's valuation in action would not imply that it 
was not an authentic valuation after all. 
II. EXPRESSIVE NORMS 
Anderson's second requirement, however, is that in genuinely express- 
ing one's valuations in action, one thereby communicate one's regard 
for the object's importance to some possible observer or listener. To 
do this requires that others can identify our behavior as appropriate, 
that is, as meeting shared behavioral standards for expressing that 
valuation. This is the sense in which Anderson wants to claim that 
expressing valuations is governed by shared social norms relative to 
which others can recognize our behavior as expressing the valuations 
we intend to express by it. So in order to count as an authentic valua- 
tion, on Anderson's view, an agent must not only manifest overtly a 
positive valuational attitude. Indeed, she must not only also express 
that attitude in action that establishes a relationship to the object she 
values. In addition, the action must be intelligible to others as an 
expression of her regard for that object. If the action through which 
the agent expresses her connection and regard for the object valued 
does not (or could not) communicate that regard to other agents, she 
does not qualify as authentically valuing that object at all. 
This is a very strong claim. But there is no ambiguity in Anderson's 
formulation of it. She argues that "I am capable of valuing something 
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in a particular way only in a social setting that upholds norms for that 
mode of valuation.... To care about something in a distinctive way, 
one must participate in a social practice of valuation governed by 
norms for its sensible expression" (p. 12). Earlier I suggested that 
intrinsically valuing a person or thing requires not only a complex of 
favorable emotions and dispositions toward her or it, but also that 
this complex exhibit a certain internal consistency determined by our 
concept of valuation itself. So, as we saw, loving one's children requires 
pride on some occasions, alarm and a disposition to rescue them on 
others. This suggestion was consistent with the exclusive conception 
of an attitude, since it did not require a necessary connection between 
these emotional and dispositional responses on the one hand and action 
on the other. By contrast, we can now see that Anderson's account 
does, and more. Her idea is that one must conform one's action to 
the shared behavioral norms prescribing appropriate expression of a 
particular mode of valuation in order to be said to value something 
in that way at all. 
The example she gives is that of honoring someone. Her claim 
is that if we do not physically do what counts socially as honoring her, 
for example, treating her deferentially, applauding her, or paying her 
obeisance under the appropriate circumstances, we cannot be said 
truly to honor her. This seems right. But these are all actions whose 
connections to valuational mental states of the agent is contingent at 
best. Honoring may usually include valuational attitudes such as re- 
spect, admiration, perhaps affection, or esteem. But the concept of 
honoring someone is not exhausted by the constellation of attitudes 
we take toward her, nor are any of those just named necessary condi- 
tions of it. It is much more closely linked to public performative rituals, 
and much more detached from any particular set of emotional states, 
in ways that other valuational attitudes are not. Honoring is in this 
way much more like promising or proclaiming than like appreciating 
or admiring. 
To claim that one does not really value something unless one 
conforms to social norms for expressing that valuation seems much 
too strong, for it makes impossible inarticulate or concealed valuation, 
being at a loss to express the depth or intensity or particular quality 
of one's valuation of a person or thing, or of doing so awkwardly, 
or of trying to express one's emotional response and failing. To say 
that there is a natural link between authentic valuation and action 
is not thereby to say that there is a necessary link between them, 
nor to say that the action expresses that valuation successfully, nor 
that it does so in accordance with shared social norms for expressing 
that valuation. 
A recent television commercial illustrates this point. A man takes 
a woman to a candlelight dinner at an expensive restaurant. The 
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occasion is clearly a special one, through which he intends to express 
his feelings for her. Over drinks he gives her a small, wrapped gift, a 
jewel box seemingly intended for a ring. Her manner is expectant and 
loving. She open the box to find a ceramic pin with the cartoon face 
of a clown on it. She looks up at him in shock and astonishment. He 
smiles uncomfortably. "Next time, better call 1-800-FLOWERS," the 
voice-over intones. The implication is clear that he has expressed his 
affection for her inappropriately. Perhaps he has. But perhaps he 
intended to express something else. Perhaps he meant to portray him- 
self as a clown and symbolically give himself to her. Or to communicate 
that they should lighten up in this relationship and not lose their sense 
of humor just because they were getting involved. Or to suggest that 
he loves her for the madcap clown she really is rather than the self- 
important facade she presents to the world, and to give her a means 
by which to advertise a more lighthearted self-image. The setting 
makes clear that he meant to show how much he values her, and also 
that he lacks the social resources for expressing in what exactly that 
valuation consists. Perhaps the culture contains no such resources, or 
perhaps he is just unschooled in the ways of love. 
Thus, as it stands, Anderson's analysis disses dorks, geeks, nerds, 
and dweebs. But even for the most highly socialized and sophisticated 
among us, sometimes there really are no words adequate to express 
our gratitude for another's support, nothing we can do to demonstrate 
the depth of our affection, no way to express our heartfelt apprecia- 
tion-and simply saying this, or doing nothing, doesn't do the trick, 
either. This doesn't mean that we do not have those attitudes. 
If conforming to shared norms for expressing our valuations were 
a necessary condition of valuing something, it would be hard to see 
how new and original forms of social expression of these attitudes 
could arise, or what would motivate their creation, or how they could 
be recognized as original ways of expressing those attitudes. What of 
attitudes people in fact have that may not (yet) make sense to a society, 
such as the desire to rebel, detach, explore, or innovate? What of 
societies that do have norms needed to adequately express their mem- 
bers' reflectively endorsed valuations, but none for valuations that 
are recognizably among the panoply of human valuations but not 
reflectively endorsed? And what of societies whose norms for express- 
ing their members' valuations are themselves not reflectively endors- 
able? 
Anderson agrees that "a social order can be criticized for failing 
to provide adequate normative vehicles for the expression of attitudes 
that have come to make sense to its members.... If a society lacks 
the social norms needed to adequately express its members' reflectively 
endorsed valuations, the rational thing to do is to invent and institute 
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such norms" (p. 18). But if people can make reflectively endorsed 
valuations in the absence of adequate social norms for expressing 
them, then expressing those valuations in conformity with the norms 
cannot be a necessary condition for the existence of the reflectively 
endorsed valuations themselves. 
ILL. MAKING SENSE OF VALUE 
This brings us to Anderson's conception of a valuation's making sense, 
of its being reflectively endorsable. Just as Anderson equates having 
the constellation of favorable attitudes constitutive of a particular mode 
of valuation with expressing it in norm-governed action, she also 
equates rational valuation with expressing one's valuations through 
reflectively endorsable norm-governed action. Thus, Anderson wants 
to distinguish between valuing something and that thing's being valu- 
able. She improves on Mill's formulation by stipulating that something 
is valuable if it makes sense for someone to value it (pp. 91-92, 102, 
124) and if it meets standards it makes sense for someone to value 
(pp. 114-15). 
The concept of a thing's making sense is a central one for Ander- 
son. Here she deploys two locutions. In some passages she speaks 
interpretively, of making sense of our attitudes. For example, she char- 
acterizes the quest for self-understanding as "an attempt to make sense 
of our own valuational responses to the world" (p. 3) and the coziness 
of a bedroom as making sense of "[one's] feeling snug when [one] 
retire[s] there" (p. 4). Later she suggests that "if either [of two very 
different and incommensurable ways of adequately expressing one's 
valuations of one's ends] makes adequate, but very different sense, of 
one's valuations, then reason permits the pursuit of either one" (p. 
63), and that "one can make sense of one's own attitudes only by taking 
up a point of view from which others can also make sense of them" 
(p. 95), and that "to justify an evaluative claim is to appeal to reasons 
that make sense of particular attitudes toward the evaluated object" 
(p. 97), and finally that 'justification is concerned with making sense 
of our concerns and attitudes" (p. 111). 
In these passages Anderson treats some attitudes as a given. Mak- 
ing sense of them is then equivalent to finding the interpretation 
or explanation of given mental phenomena that makes them most 
comprehensible to oneself and others. On this reading, to justify one's 
valuations is just to explain them with reasons why. The interpretive 
locution has the advantage that it does not beg any questions about 
what valuations or attitudes any particular interlocutor might think 
one should have. It is a comparatively weak requirement on justifica- 
tion, in that it requires only that I understand your values, whether 
or not I share them. To complain that a valuation does not make sense 
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is, on this reading, to complain not that it is personally unacceptable, 
but that it is unintelligible, that is, that it violates certain basic condi- 
tions of conceptual coherence and consistency. 
In other passages, however, she speaks prescriptively, of what it 
makes sensefor someone to do. Were two friends to become enemies, 
she argues, "it would make sense for [one] to stop cherishing" an ugly 
bracelet given her by the other (p. 19). Similarly, she says, it "makes 
sense for a person to value most [states of affairs] only because it makes 
sense for a person to care about the people, animals, communities, and 
things concerned with them" (p. 20), and "what it makes sense to do 
now essentially depends on what one has done in the past" (p. 34). 
Later she argues that "if goods are not commensurable, then it does 
not make sense to maximize their values" (p. 46). She defines a stan- 
dard as "authentic if and only if ... it could make sense for a person 
to guide her responses by it" and as important to a person "if it makes 
sense for her to care about it" (p. 48). Similarly, she says that "which 
higher-order good it makes sense to use in justifying a person's choices 
depends on the context of decision" (p. 54), that "it makes sense to 
value different goods in different ways" (p. 72), and that "the condi- 
tions that make states of affairs valuable are not other states of affairs, 
but the people, animals, and things it makes sense to care directly 
about" (p. 85). 
In these passages, what it makes sense for someone to do is what 
there is reason for doing. To justify one's valuations is to demonstrate 
that the balance of reasons prescribes it. And to state that it makes 
sense for someone to do something is to state that the balance of 
reasons prescribes it. It is to advocate the doing of that thing. Thus, 
it presupposes and expresses a set of values with which one's listener 
is assumed to agree. The prescriptive locution in this sense imposes 
a much stronger condition on justification than the interpretive one. 
Anderson's explicit definition of making sense supports the pre- 
scriptive locution but not the interpretive one. To judge that one's 
valuations make sense, for Anderson, is "to judge that they would be 
endorsed" from a hypothetical, common point of view in which people 
can both achieve one another's valuations and also reflectively endorse 
them. The process of reaching this point of view is a process in which 
"people interpret and justify their valuations by exchanging reasons 
for them" (p. 3). Part of exchanging reasons for one's valuations is 
being "able to tell a story that makes sense of [an] ideal, that gives it 
some compelling point, that shows how the evaluative perspective it 
defines reveals defects, limitations, or insensitivities in the perspectives 
that reject these valuings" (p. 92). Moreover, this process of justifica- 
tion is objective, on Anderson's account, if the participants in this 
dialogue can reach agreement or make progress when they adhere to 
the following norms of rational discourse: 
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A. They acknowledge the possibility of a permanent gap between 
their actual attitudes and rational ones 
B. They acknowledge the equal authority of others to offer criti- 
cisms and proposals 
C. No one competent to participate is excluded from the dialogue 
D. All apply reasons consistently to their own proposals and to 
others 
E. They aim for agreement or a common point of view 
F. They agree to work from mutually accepted reasons toward 
resolution of their differences 
G. The process contains methods for introducing new considera- 
tions as reasons and for criticizing what are currently taken 
to be reasons (p. 93) 
So one's valuations are valuable, that is, make sense, if they would be 
endorsed by others who, through adhering to norms A-G constitutive 
of the process of rational justification, comparison, and critique of 
one another's valuations, were to reach mutual agreement on their 
valuations. This process of justification is called for when people who 
have different values have some interest or need to reach agreement. 
It is possible, Anderson writes, when there is some overlap in the 
considerations each party accepts as counting for or against attitudes 
and judgments (p. 93). And it is required as a necessary condition of 
making sense of oneself and one's own values (pp. 94-95). 
This account of rational value does require that others share some 
values at the outset. It presupposes "a background of socially contin- 
gent and historically evolving social practices and conditions" (p. 102), 
as well as common ground, minimally, in "shared intuitions or in 
curiosity, trust, and a willingness to try alien practices" (p. 105). It also 
presupposes that all participants agree either on what counts as a 
reason for or against something (norms D and F) or on how to intro- 
duce new considerations as reasons for or against things (norm G). 
Together these presuppositions constitute a quite substantial area of 
shared values. Anderson's claim is that unless one's valuations conform 
to the hypothetical point of view delineated by these norms, one cannot 
make sense of oneself or them at all. 
IV. MAKING SENSE OF ONESELF 
In this discussion so far I have been concerned to make room in 
Anderson's metaethics for valuational attitudes people can have but 
not express, or express but not in socially familiar or acceptable ways. 
I have wanted to insist on the existence of such anomalous attitudes, as 
I will call them, even in the face of social ignorance or incomprehen- 
sion of them. I will now want to insist on the rational value of some 
anomalous attitudes even though they do not meet some of the ratio- 
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nality conditions Anderson requires. I will want to show that such 
anomalous attitudes can be valuable, that is, rational, even though they 
are not reflectively endorsable by other members of a social community 
governed by norms for their expression. 
Consider someone whose valuational attitudes are marginal with 
respect to all the social communities in which he moves. Suppose, for 
example, that the background of social practices and conditions in 
which he was raised is at odds with the two in which he now lives and 
commutes, that these two are at odds with each other, and that the 
two in which he now lives and commutes have alienated him from the 
one in which he was raised. Also suppose that because of his outsider 
status with respect to all three cultures, his intuitions, perceptions, 
and beliefs about the inhabitants of each are greatly at odds with the 
intuitions, perceptions, and beliefs the inhabitants of each culture have 
about themselves, and similarly at odds with the intuitions, percep- 
tions, and beliefs each culture has about the others. Suppose further 
that this outsider status has virtually sated his curiosity and willingness 
to try alien practices by requiring him, as a condition of his own 
adaptation and survival, to study and gain extensive familiarity with 
the mores of each culture-to become more knowledgeable about 
each culture, in fact, than any single inhabitant of any of the three 
cultures is about her own. Moreover, suppose his outsider status has 
brought upon him repeated and consistent social ostracism, rejection, 
and punishment, so that his ability to trust any member of any of the 
three cultures is virtually nonexistent. 
It is not implausible that, as the result of his experience as an 
interloper in all three social communities, his conception of what 
counts as a reason in favor of certain basic matters might be equally 
at odds with others' conceptions, so that it would not be possible to 
apply certain reasons consistently both to his and to others' proposals. 
That certain lifestyles were socially isolating, for example, might count 
as a reason against them for members of any of the three communities, 
but as a consideration in their favor for him; that certain activities 
would bring one face to face with one's own mortality might count as 
a reason against them for others but as a reason for them for him; 
that certain kinds of relationships would fill his life with connection 
to others might count as a reason against them for him but a reason 
for them for others; and so forth. 
Similarly, it is not implausible that, given his experiences, he 
might not agree with members of any of the three social communities 
on how to introduce into the dialogue new considerations for or against 
things as reasons. By hypothesis he would be fully conversant with 
the practices members of all three cultures agreed on for doing this 
something analogous, let us suppose, to following Robert's Rules of 
Order. But he might justifiably think these practices inadequate for 
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introducing considerations that were radically unlike the considera- 
tions members of these cultures were conditioned to recognize as rea- 
sons. He might think that precisely because of their social cohesion 
and conformity, there were certain sorts of quite important reasons 
that members of all three communities simply were not psychologically 
or socially equipped to consider-that they just wouldn't "get it." 
And he might think that only quite radical presentations of these 
considerations-in theatrical or otherwise dramatic symbolic form, 
perhaps, or in acts of self-immolation or antisocial destruction, might 
lead the light to dawn. Being unwilling or unable to perform such 
acts himself, he might conclude that there was no way for him to tell 
the story that made sense of his ideals, that would give it a compelling 
point or reveal the defects, limitations, or insensitivities in the perspec- 
tives of an audience of interlocutors whose experiences were so radi- 
cally different from and limited relative to his own. Although he might 
fully understand their valuations, he might realistically conclude that 
there was no way for him to make his valuations intelligible to them. 
For all of these reasons, his valuations would not be rationally 
endorsable by other participants in the rational dialogue Anderson 
describes, nor might he think it worth his while even to participate in 
it. But this would not imply that he was unable to make sense of his 
own values. First, it would not imply this for the interpretive locution. 
He would be able to explain his attitudes and values in the same terms 
I have just described, offering reasons why he values and disvalues as 
he does that would enable us to understand his valuations even if we 
do not share them. Second, that his values were not rationally endors- 
able from Anderson's hypothetical common point of view would not 
imply that it would not make sense prescriptively for him to respond 
and act as he does. He could, by hypothesis, give realistic and well- 
grounded reasonsfor valuing solitude, silence, and confrontation with 
mortality, such that we would be compelled to recognize the rational 
integrity of his perspective even if we did not share it. That these values 
would not make sense from the shared perspective of a community of 
participants engaged in rational dialogue of the kind Anderson de- 
scribes does not imply that they do not make sense at all. 
Third and most important, that these anomalous values were not 
thus rationally endorsable would not imply that our marginalized 
agent could not make sense of himself. Anderson argues that "one 
can make sense of one's own attitudes only by taking up a point of 
view from which others can also make sense of them.... We can make 
sense of ourselves only by participating in practices of justification" 
(p. 95). By contrast, this agent would make sense of his own attitudes 
from a perspective to which no one else had access, namely, the per- 
spective of having experienced the three disparate social communities 
in the unique and particular ways that he had. And he would be able 
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to do this even though he had, by hypothesis, declined to participate 
in a social practice of justification of the kind Anderson advocates. 
Now Anderson argues that "making sense of ourselves is not a 
matter of theorizing about an object whose properties we cannot affect. 
We make ourselves intelligible to ourselves by cultivating attitudes that 
make sense to us, by determining to act in accord with ideals we accept 
that have survived critical scrutiny" (p. 91). She claims that part of 
the quest for self-understanding requires that when we recognize in 
ourselves attitudes that we cannot endorse from the hypothetical com- 
mon point of view governed by shared social norms of discourse, we 
reform these attitudes "so that they make sense in the context of 
an enlarged self-understanding" (p. 96). Thus, self-understanding, on 
Anderson's view, requires active self-determination through the culti- 
vation of attitudes that are reflectively endorsable from the hypotheti- 
cal common point of view. 
Again I think this is too strong. It implies that we cannot make 
sense of what we cannot either endorse or improve, and so that those 
intractable and incorrigible parts of the self that are so necessary for 
bringing us face to face with our imperfections, our guilt, and our 
personal limitations must remain opaque or impenetrable to rational 
analysis. It also implies that we can easily improve what we cannot 
initially endorse, and I have yet to see an account of how this is sup- 
posed to work that does not degenerate into exhortations to bootstrap 
the triumph of the will over the flesh. Most people cannot even manage 
to stay on a low-cholesterol diet. 
But my main concern is what it implies for the possibility of social 
and cultural change. Earlier I asked how new and original expressions 
of valuational attitudes could arise, if conforming those expressions 
to shared social norms were a necessary condition of their existence. 
The same question can be asked about new and original valuational 
attitudes themselves. Demographically mobile societies such as this one 
are constantly creating marginalized agents of the sort just described. 
Through upward mobility we may move from our original class back- 
grounds to higher ones, and to different ethnic or cultural groups, 
through education and professional training; through downward mo- 
bility and economic contraction we may move in the reverse direction, 
and thereby into other new ethnic or lifestyle communities-perhaps 
even into homelessness or penal incarceration; through travel, new 
technologies, or contact with other cultures that create new possibilities 
for experience or lifestyle, we may find our most basic values or lifestyle 
preferences undergoing radical revision. Anderson conceives the rele- 
vant contrast along Marxist economic lines, as between individualistic 
and social conceptions of rational attitudes. But a society as marked by 
heterogeneous social values as this one owes its plethora of anomalous 
attitudes at least as much to its ethnic and class diversity and mobility 
as it does to its capitalist economic structure. 
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Agents who undergo these social, economic, and cultural shifts 
are regularly confronted with disparities between their own anomalous 
attitudes and those that are socially endorsed by the community at 
hand. Under these circumstances, one always faces the choice of to 
which source authoritative weight should be ascribed. Either one may 
conclude that one's own values are inappropriate, and take steps to 
reform them in accordance with the norms of the community, or one 
may conclude that the norms of the community are inappropriate, 
and take steps to reform them in accordance with one's own values. 
Those who are strongly identified with the norms of a particular com- 
munity will incline to choose the former alternative; marginalized 
agents by definition have a greater capacity to choose the latter. With- 
out this capacity, it is hard to see how social and cultural value change 
could occur. 
When value change does occur, it does not require that one con- 
struct or even envision an alternative community that adopts and 
enacts the norms of rational dialogue Anderson describes, nor that 
one rely on such a hypothetical community to endorse and legitimate 
the anomalous attitudes one may know independently to be rational. 
A marginalized agent can recognize his anomalous values as rational 
if, to summarize briefly, (1) he can causally explain them by his experi- 
ences, (2) he can in turn cite these values as reasons for his behavior 
and attitudes, and (3) these values, and the experiences that form 
them, are internally coherent. Of course this does not imply that 
they are therefore morally acceptable to any actual or hypothetical 
community. Whether they are or not, what any actual or hypothetical 
community thinks about them is irrelevant to their rationality. 
Therefore, social and cultural value change does not require that 
"if our lives are to be meaningful, then we must adopt a perspective 
informed by the expressive theory as our global mode of deliberating 
about and justifying our actions, emotions, and attitudes" (p. 83). Since 
rationality is itself a value, it is unclear why Anderson, after successfully 
developing a fully pluralistic theory of value, thinks she needs to 
ground it with monistic and global criteria of rationality. Social and 
cultural value change requires only marginalized agents whose anoma- 
lous values are sufficiently secure, independent of the community's, 
and well grounded in their experience to furnish the distanced critical 
perspective from which the community's can be found to be lacking. 
That is the kind of agent for which I believe a genuinely pluralistic, 
rational attitude theory of value such as Anderson's can and must 
make room. 
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